Multiple Equilibria in a Growth Model with Habit Persistence by Been-Lon Chen
ʕ̯޼Ӻ৫຾᏶הኪஔ޼ী論˖ 




Multiple Equilibria in a Growth Model with   
Habit Persistence 
Been-Lon Chen 




Institute of Economics 
Academia Sinica 






ʕ̯޼Ӻ৫  ຾᏶޼Ӻה 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, ACADEMIA SINICA 
TAIWAN 
copyright @ 2004 (Been-Lon Chen) Multiple Equilibria in a Growth Model with Habit Persistence
Been-Lon Chen*
Academia Sinica
This Draft: April 2004
Abstract
This paper uses an otherwise standard, competitive growth model without externality and distortions
to establish multiple balanced growth paths.  Our model is based on the standard one-sector, endogenous
growth model of Romer (1986), with a twist that households’ preference depends partly upon how his/her
consumption compares to a habit stock formed by his/her own past consumption. This model establishes
multiple equilibria because habit persistence in preference induces an intertemporal  complementarity effect
among consumption flows, with current consumption reinforcing future consumption.  As a result, there exist
two balanced-growth paths, with one path exhibiting low consumption and habits and high economic growth,
and the other exhibiting high consumption and habits and low growth, and thus a development trap.  Both
steady states are saddle points, but an initial condition cannot pin down the steady state to which an economy
converges.  Both steady states cannot be pareto-ranked because of no market failure.
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Recently there has been interest in economic models with multiple steady states.  This strand is
motivated by several empirical studies that document the existence of multiple development clubs (e.g.,
Baumol and Wolff, 1988; Quah, 1996; Durlauf and Quah, 1999).  In accordance with the facts are  models
in economic development that display poverty traps, where economies with low initial capital stocks or
incomes converge to a steady state with low per capita income, while economies with high initial capital
stocks converge to a different steady state that corresponds to high per capita income.  
The existing literature in models of economic development with multiple steady states may be
broadly classified into three lines.  One line concerns models of industrialization with externality in a modern
technology, in which the productivity of a modern technology is enhanced by the number of firms using the
technology, and an economy with low initial income chooses to use the traditional technology and is thus
trapped in a steady state with low per capital income (e.g., Matsuyama, 1991; Krugman, 1991; Chen and
Shimomura, 1998; Chen, Mo and Wang, 2002).  A second line examines models of fertility choices and a
tradeoff between the time allocated to bearing and rearing children and the time devoted to educating
children, with the result that households find a large number of children in their best interests, leading to an
equilibrium with low per capital income (e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990; Galor and Weil,1996;
Palivos, 2001).  Finally, a third line investigates costly intermediation in which a participation externality,
where the cost of financial intermediation depends negatively on the mass of consumers, generates multiple
steady states (e.g., Cooper and Ejarque, 1995; Becsi, Wang and Wynne, 1999).  All these studies incorporate
some forms of externality, which generates multiple equilibria through an external complementarity effect
among households/investors.
1
This paper uses a model to establish multiple steady states without relying on externality.  Our model
is based on an otherwise standard competitive, one-sector, endogenous growth model (e.g., Romer, 1986),2
with a departure that households’ preference depends partly upon how his/her consumption compares to a
habit stock formed by his/her own past consumption. This model creates multiple equilibria for the following
reasons.  With habit affecting preferences, high/low future consumption is expected to be associated with
high/low current consumption, in order to attain a given level of utility for a household.  This effect induces
an internal, intertemporal complementarity effect among consumption flows, with current consumption
reinforcing future consumption.  More specifically, for a given initial state an agent may choose optimally
to consume more or little now.  As high/low current consumption forms habits quickly/slowly, s/he has to
consume more/little in the future to obtain a proper consumption level in comparison to a high/low habit
stock, in order to obtain the desired utility level.  As a result, there are multiple equilibrium paths for
consumption, with high/low future consumption expectations leading to high/low current consumption
choices, all consistent with expectations.  Consequently, the habits are formed quickly/slowly and capital
stock is accumulated slowly/quickly in the equilibrium path associated with high/low consumption.  As an
effect of capital accumulation, the economic growth rate is low/high. 
The two steady states are saddle points.  For given initial capital and habit stocks, however, the initial
history cannot pin down which steady state to converge, and  the economy could converge to any of the two
steady states depending upon the choices of consumption level.  In the neighborhood of a steady state, a small
disturbance leads the economy to shift locally to a new steady state around the original steady state, if the
shadow habit price responds quickly.  However, if the consumption responds faster than the shadow habit
price in the face of a small disturbance, the equilibrium will globally converge to a steady state with low or
high growth no matter where the original steady state is.  These features differentiate the results of our model
from the aforementioned studies with regard to two steady states.  In some of these works, the steady states
are both saddle points and there exists a threshold level that an initial condition determines the steady state
to which an economy converges.  In the reaming works, one of the steady states is a sink and the other is a
saddle point, and globally, for most given initial conditions an economy converges to the steady state that
is a sink.  Moreover, the steady states in existing works can be pareto-ranked because of market failures in
their models.  The steady states cannot be pareto-ranked in our model because of no market failures.
Finally, the idea of habit persistence in preferences is hardly new, and dates to Marshall (1898) and2 A related class of the models with intertemporal dependence in tastes is models with endogenous time
preference rates pioneered by Uzawa (1968) and Wan (1970).   See Shi and Epstein (1993) for a model that includes
both habit formation and a variable time-preference rate, and Palivos, Wang and Zhang (1997) for a model of






e ￿￿t u( c(t)
S ￿(t)
)dt, ￿ > 0, 0<￿<1, (1a)
Dusenbery (1949).  Recent years have seen applications in macroeconomics.  Literature on asset pricing
under habit persistence in preferences has been developing; see Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990) and
Campbell and Cochrane (1999).  The habit-persistence-in-preference feature has also been adopted in
business cycle models, in order to explain some stylized features in business cycles (Boldrin, Christiano and
Fisher, 2001); to demonstrate how procyclical tax policy affects the economy countercyclically (Ljungqvist
and Uhlig, 2000); and to improve the responses of both spending and inflation to monetary-policy actions
(Fuhrer, 2000).  Finally, the habit persistence feature has been employed in endogenous growth models to
obtain the result that increases in growth can cause increased savings (Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000).
2
As developed below, the theoretical model will be presented in the next section.  Section 3 studies
balanced-growth paths and transitional dynamics, while Section 4 examines the effects of two disturbances
in relation to habit persistence.  Concluding remarks will be made in Section 5.
2.  Basic Model
Our basic model draws on Romer (1986) and Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000).  Consider an
economy populated by households and firms.  There exists a continuum of infinite-lived, identical
households, with no population growth.  There also exists a continuum of representative firms, and
households own the shares.  It  follows that the economy is a world of a representative household-producer.
2-1.  Environment  
  The representative household is assumed to possess the following discounted, lifetime utility






















￿ S ￿ Bc µ(t)S 1￿µ(t) ￿ ￿sS(t), 1/2<µ￿1, S(0)>0 given, (2)
habitual stock.  Parameter ￿ indexes the importance of habits.  If ￿ = 0 then only the absolute level of
consumption is important; while if ￿ = 1, then consumption relative to the habitual stock is what matters.
For values of ￿ between 0 and 1, both the absolute and relative levels are important.   For this study, we
assume 0 < ￿ <1 so that absolute consumption level is not a consumer’s concern.  To facilitate the analysis,
we have adopted a parametric felicity by assuming the following CES functional form 
Assumption ￿>1 is crucial for the results of multiple interior steady states.  The presumption rules
out the logarithmic felicity form, requiring one with curvature steeper than a logarithmic form.  Restriction
￿>1 is consistent with most empirical findings that intertemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than one.
The stock of habits is assumed to evolve according to
in which  B>0 represents a technology coefficient that forms past consumption flows into habits, with ￿s￿0
describing how existing habitual stock depreciates.  Thus, a current consumption flow generates a long-
lasting effect in a manner summarized by the stock of habits.
Equation (2) is more general than the specification in Carroll, et al. (2000).  Here we follow other
authors, such as Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Lettau and Uhlig (2000) to assume that consumption
accumulates future habits in relation to existing habitual stocks. More specifically, we assume that current
consumption flows contribute toward future habit formation, possibly in association with existing habits;
therefore, restriction µ￿1 is made,
3 and to be consistent with a perpetual growth framework the formation
technology is assumed to be of constant returns with respect to existing habits and current consumption.
Moreover, restriction µ>1/2 is assumed so that current consumption contributes to forming future habitual5
y(t) ￿ Ak(t), k(0)>0 given, (3)
￿ k ￿ y(t)￿c(t)￿￿kk(t), (4)
H(c, k, S, ￿k ￿s) ￿ 1
1￿￿
[( c
S ￿)1￿￿￿1]￿￿k[Ak￿c￿￿kk]￿￿s[Bc µS 1￿µ￿￿sS],
stock more than current habits do.  This formulation implies that the marginal productivity of consumption
flows in forming habitual stocks is Bµ, which is less than or equal to B.  It should be remarked that when
B=￿s=0, past consumption does not form the habitual stock.  Then, the  model is reduced to conventional one-
sector, endogenous growth models (e.g., Romer, 1986).
The representative firm is assumed to own the following production technology
where y(t) is output, k(t) is capital stock, and A>0 is a parameter.  The technology is abstracted from labor
so that capital stock should be interpreted broadly to include physical, as well as human capital (e.g., Rebelo,
1991). 
Finally, as households own firms’ shares, the representative household’s budget constraint is
where ￿k￿0 is capital’s depreciation rate.  This equation says that disposable income, not consumed currently,
becomes savings, which augments capital.  
2-2.  Optimization
The representative household’s problem is to choose consumption, in order to maximize its
discounted, lifetime utility (1a) and (1b), subject to habitual stock formation (2), production technology (3)
and budget constraints (4), taking existing capital stock k(t) and habits S(t) as predetermined.  To solve the
dynamic optimization problem, we define the following current-value Hamiltonian
where ￿k and ￿s denote the costate variables associated with (2) and (4), respectively.  We should note that
the shadow price of habit stock, -￿s, is negative.  The negative shadow price on habit stocks reflects the fact
















c 1￿µ , (5a)














e ￿￿tH(t)￿ 0. (5d)
follows we call the absolute value of the shadow price of habit stocks, ￿s, as the shadow habit price. Although
under ￿>1 the felicity is strictly concave in c(t), for 0<￿￿1 it is not concave in S(t) as a higher existing habit
stock lowers utility.  Since felicity function u is not concave in c and S, the Mangasarian sufficient theorem
cannot be used.  Instead, we need to apply the Arrow sufficient theorem to guarantee the concavity of the
Hamiltonain (see Arrow and Kurz, 1970).  Denote
   ˆ H(k, S, ￿k, ￿s)￿
Max
{c￿R ￿}
H(c, k, S, ￿k, ￿S).
In Appendix 1 we have shown that when µ=1, under a mild condition   is concave ˆ H(k, S, ￿k(t), ￿s(t))
in k and S for fixed values of ￿k, ￿k and t.
4  For Case µ<1, as long as µ is large enough, by continuity a similar
condition assures   to be concave in k and S for fixed values of ￿k, ￿k and t.  Therefore, k*(t), ˆ H(k, S, ￿k(t), ￿s(t))
S*(t) and c*(t) solve problem (1)-(4).  As  is not strictly concave in k and S, therefore  k*(t), ˆ H(k, S, ￿k(t), ￿s(t))
S*(t) and c*(t) are not necessarily unique.
 Denote ￿ as the time-preference rate.  Applying the Pontryagin maximum principle, we get the
following first-order conditions
together with (2) and (4), and the transversality condition
5
Equation (5a) equates the marginal utility of current consumption to the marginal costs of  foregone
savings, net of the effect via the habit formation.  Conditions (5b) and (5c) are two Euler equations that7
￿ ￿s
￿s
￿ ￿s￿ ￿￿ ￿ x
￿
￿ B[1￿µ￿µ￿]x µ. (6a)
equate the net marginal productivity of capital stock, as well as the marginal utility of habitual stock,
respectively, net of depreciation, to the time-preference rate, net of  their respective capital gains (or losses).
  
3.  Balanced Growth Paths and Transitional Dynamics
We are now ready to analyze the competitive market equilibrium.  



















(i) habitual stock formation; i.e., (2);
(ii) production technology; i.e., (3).
(iii)  households’ budgets; i.e., (4);
(iv)  representative household-firm optimization; i.e., (5a)-(5d).
 
To analyze the market equilibrium, we transform the economic system into a 3x3 system in three








second-order time derivatives of consumption when we keep the relative shadow price in the system, and is
more simplified than the method utilized in Carroll, et al. (2000).  This solution method is in line with the
solution method used in Obtsfeld (1990) and Benhabib and Perli (1994), among others.
In order to derive the three-variable system, first we divide (5a) by (5c) to obtain




































































Notice that since (A-￿k) is the marginal product of capital, expression    reduces to the formulation ￿ c
c
in existing one-sector, endogenous growth models when B=￿=0, with the long-run, intertemporal elasticity
of substitution equal 1/￿.  With B>0 and ￿>0 for habit formation, (6b) suggests that in the long-run,
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is   which for ￿>1is smaller than 1/￿, even for [￿￿(￿￿µ￿1)Bµ ￿
x1￿µ]￿1,
µ=1. This result is in contrast to the finding of the long-run, intertemporal elasticity being larger than 1/￿ in
an economy with  habit formation in Carroll, et al. (2000) which resorts to the second-order time derivatives
of c in order to derive the transitional dynamics of their economic system.  Intuitively, current consumption
forms habit stock that complements future consumption, thus lowering  intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for consumption. 
Therefore, we have:
Proposition 1.  An economy with habit formation has a lower, long-run, intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for consumption  than one without habit formation.
Finally, the economic system cannot be analyzed without transforming the growing variables into
great ratios.  We take differences between (6b) and (2), (6a) and (5b), and finally, (4) and (2) to obtain the








Typically, the three-variable system is difficult to analyze.  This is not the case here due to the block-
recursive nature of the system.  Capital to habit ratio, z, enters the system only through equation (7c); the
other two equations form a separate subsystem in x and ￿.  Thus, while consumption and thus x affects
physical capital accumulation and thereby capital to habit ratio, the ratio of capital to habits affects lifetime
utility and consumption only by determining the initial optimal choices of these variables.  Once these initial
choices are made, ￿ and x evolve automatically.  More specifically, while (7a) and (7b) jointly determine
{￿(t), x(t)}, (7c) determines z(t).  When the three-variable system is solved, all other endogenous variables







by (4), and finally,  the consumption growth rate,   is determined by (6b).   Therefore, the market ￿ c
c(t)
,
equilibrium can be characterized by analyzing system (7a)-(7c).
3-1. Balanced Growth Paths
We now determine the equilibrium in steady state.  A balanced-growth path (BGP) is a steady-state,
competitive market equilibrium, in  which all growing variables grow at a constant rate over time.  Therefore,
 in the steady state.  We use the conventional method to determine the balanced-growth path by ￿ x￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ z￿ 0
investigating the shape of Loci summarized by (7a)-(7c) in two planes.
First, we start with Locus   in a (￿, x) plane as it is less complicated.  Differentiating (7b) with ￿ ￿￿0
respect to x and ￿, evaluated at   the slope of Locus   is ￿ ￿￿0, ￿ ￿￿0
where a21 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ [1￿(1￿￿)µ]Bµ ￿￿
x ￿1￿µ < 0, and ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Bµ￿￿ < 0, if µ￿1,
a22 ￿ ￿ x ￿
￿￿ > 0.
Thus, Locus   is upward sloping.  Moreover, we have shown that Locus   starts from the origin and ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿0














> 0, if x >
< ˆ x, (8b)
Next, in order to analyze the shape of Locus  we impose ￿ x￿0,
Condition R:  (￿￿1)(1￿￿)￿s > ￿,
which is easy to meet as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has been documented smaller than one
and the time preference rate is usually low.  Note that for ￿<1 Condition R implies    Under (￿￿1)(1￿￿￿s) > ￿.
Condition R there is a positive threshold separating the behavior for Locus  as follows. ￿ x￿0
If we differentiate Locus  with respect to ￿ and x, we obtain ￿ x￿0




















￿ ￿(1￿￿)}<0, if µ￿1, B 2(￿￿￿)>￿(￿￿1),
a12￿￿ Bµ x µ
￿
[￿￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿)￿s￿B(￿￿µ￿1)(1￿￿)x µ)] <
> 0, if x >









> 0, if µ￿1, x >





x 1￿µ > 0, and ￿ ￿￿￿B￿>0, if µ￿1.
For a11, the third term in the large braces is positive and the second term is also positive under
Condition R.  Under µ>1/2 and   it suffices to assure that the first term in the large braces is positive, x ￿ x,
and as a consequence, a11<0.   We should note that even if   a11 is negative as long as the effects through x < x,
the second and third terms dominate the first term.  For a12, under Condition R it could be negative or
positive depending upon whether x is above or below threshold     Therefore,  Locus  is negatively ˆ x. ￿ x￿0
sloping if   and positively slopping if    and is thus not a monotonic locus as illustrated in Figure x ￿ ˆ x, x ￿ ˆ x,
1. For   we have shown that Locus   has an infinite slope and has the x axis as the asymptote when x ￿ ˆ x, ￿ x￿06 The slope is  as  
dx




> 0, x0 < ˆ x.
7 The condition for  is (1-￿)[(￿+µ-1)(A-￿k)+µ￿s]+￿+(1+￿)µ[(￿-1)(1-￿)￿ -￿]>0, which is always met e >ˆ x
under Condition R.  













￿ A￿ ￿k￿ x ￿
z ￿. (9)
x approaches infinity, and Line   as the asymptote when ￿ approaches infinity.  Alternatively, for  x ￿ ˆ x x ￿ ˆ x,






positive slope  at Point (0, x0),
6 and approaches Line  when ￿ approaches infinity.  x ￿ ˆ x
Given the shapes of Loci   and   in Figure 1, as 
7 these two loci have two interior ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ x￿0 e >ˆ x,
intersections.
8  Therefore, there exist two interior BGPs, as indicated by points H and L in the figure, with
BGP H having higher consumption to habit ratio and higher price of habit to price of capital ratio, while BGP
L having lower consumption to habit ratio and lower price of habit to price of capital ratio.  
Finally, in order to compare the economic growth rate for the two BGPs, we analyze Locus  . ￿ z￿0
The slope of Locus   is ￿ z￿0
where  a31 ￿￿ (1￿ Bµx ￿µ￿1
z ￿) < 0, and ￿￿(1￿ Bz) < 0, if µ ￿1,
  a33 ￿ x ￿
z ￿ > 0,
which is positively sloping and, moreover, is concave in a (x, z) plane.  Therefore, BGP H is associated with
a higher capital to habit stock ratio, while BGP L is associated with a lower capital habit stock ratio.   
The economic growth rate can be rewritten using (4), along with (3), to obtain




























than  in BGP L, the long-run, economic growth rate in BGP H is thereby larger than in BGP L.  Since
xL
zL












consumption in BGP H leads to slower habit accumulation, the price of habit is thus higher in BGP H,
resulting in ￿H > ￿L in Figure 1.
In summary,
Proposition 2.  There exists two BGPs in an economy with habit formation, with one BGP having a higher
economic growth rate and the other having a lower economic growth rate. 
3-2.  Dynamics
We now proceed to analyze the dynamic properties of the three-variable system by examining its
transitional dynamics.  The transitional dynamics of the economic system can be analyzed if we linearize the
dynamic system of (7a)-(7c), evaluated at a BGP {x*, ￿*
 , z*}, to yield
where (aij)s are as defined in Section 3.
As the dynamic system of (7a)-(7c) involves one state variable, z, and two control variables, x and
￿, there exists a unique equilibrium saddle path toward a BGP if the number of negative eigenvalues near
the BGP is one, and there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths toward a BGP if the number of negative
eigenvalues near the BGP is larger than one. 
 Denote  J as the Jacobian matrix in (10) and ￿ as its eigenvalues.  When we subtract matrix J from
matrix ￿I, where I is an identity matrix of order 3, then the eigenvalues are determined by equating
determinant ￿J-￿I￿ to zero.  If we expand ￿J-￿I￿=0, we obtain the following characteristic function13
 [￿2￿ (a11￿a22)￿￿ (a11a22￿a21a22)](￿￿a33)￿0.
Solving the above polynomial function yields the following three eigenvalues,
  ￿1 ￿ 1
2
[(a11￿a22)￿ (a11￿a22)2￿4(a11a22￿a12a21)] < 0,
￿2 ￿ 1
2
[(a11￿a22)￿ (a11￿a22)2￿4(a11a22￿a12a21)] > 0,
￿3 ￿ x ￿
z ￿ > 0.
Given a11 < 0, a21 < 0 and a22 > 0, and in the neighborhood of BGP H, a12 < 0, we obtain a11a22 - a12a21
< 0.  Then,   and thus, ￿1 < 0 < ￿2 for BGP H.  On the other hand, (a11￿a22)< (a11￿a22)2￿4(a11a22￿a12a21)>0,








there is only one negative root around each BGP, and both BGPs are saddle points.  Consequently, the
dynamic growth path toward each BGP is unique.   In Figure 2, Path DD is the unique saddle path toward
BGP H, while Path FF is the unique saddle path toward BGP L. 
[Insert Figure 2 here]
In general, in models with multiple steady states and all saddle points, history or predetermined state
variables will govern the steady state to which the equilibrium moves.  See Krugman (1991) and Matsuyama
(1991) for discussion; however, this is not the case here.  As an illustration, suppose that the initial state is
at z(0) in Figure 2.  Then, there are two possible choices of consumption to habit ratios, at point A￿ and B￿,
respectively.  While point A￿ stands for low consumption, low habit accumulation, high consumption to habit
ratio and high habit price relative to capital price, point B￿ stands for high consumption, high habit
accumulation, low consumption to habit ratio and low habit price relative to capital price.  Eventually, the
equilibrium associated with point A￿ moves toward BGP H with a high economic growth rate, while the
equilibrium associated with point B￿ moves toward BGP L with a low economic growth rate.  Although the
BGPs are saddle points in our model, history z(0) alone is not able to pin down which BGP to move to. 
The reasons for two possible equilibrium paths for an initial state are as follows.  With the habit
persistence in preferences, a household’s higher current consumption is expected to lead to higher future14
consumption, in order for a consumption to habit ratio to attain a given level of utility.  This effect induces
an interaction among consumption flows, with current consumption reinforcing future consumption.  When
an agent expects to gain a certain utility level in the future, s/he may choose optimally to consume more now.
As high current consumption forms more habits, s/he has to consume more in the future to have a proper
consumption to high habit ratio in order to obtain the desired utility level.  Alternatively, s/he could optimally
choose to consume little now and in the future, in order to obtain the same utility level.  As a result, there
are two possible equilibrium paths for consumption, with high/low future consumption expectations leading
to high/low current consumption choices, and all the equilibrium paths are consistent with expectations in
equilibrium.  Consequently, the habits are formed faster in the equilibrium path associated with high
consumption than in the equilibrium path associated with low consumption, while capital stock is
accumulated slowly in the former equilibrium path, and faster in the latter equilibrium path.  As an effect of
capital accumulation, the economic growth rate is low in transitional and steady state in the former
equilibrium path, and high in the latter equilibrium path.
Summarizing the above result, we obtain 
Proposition 3.  For any given initial capital and habit stock, there are a high and a low equilibrium
consumption levels moving toward a BGP with a low and a high economic growth rate, respectively.
4.   Global Dynamics with Strong Habit Effects and Faster Habit Formation
We now analyze the dynamic equilibrium properties of small disturbances.  We use as an illustrative
example two disturbances in relation to habits: a more important habit effect (a higher ￿) and a faster habit
formation (a higher B).  We have shown that both shocks shift Loci   downward.  While  Locus  ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ x￿0
shifts upward when habits are more important for preferences (Figures 3 and 5), Locus   shifts downward, ￿ x￿0
when consumption forms new habits faster (Figures 4 and 6).  In addition, Locus   shifts downward in ￿ z￿0
response to a faster habit formation (Figures 4 and 6).  As there are local and global dynamics, we begin with
a more important habit effect in preference and local dynamics, followed by a faster habit formation and local
dynamics , and finally, global dynamics still later. 15




























[Insert Figures 3-4 here]
4-1. When Preference Depends More on Habits: Local Dynamics
Local dynamic effects depend upon where the initial steady state is located.  (The algebraic results
near each steady state are reported in Appendix 2.)  Suppose that  the economy is originally at a high-growth
equilibrium (i.e., BGP H in Figure 3).  Then, higher dependence of consumption upon habits raises habit
price to capital price ratio instantaneously if shadow habit price adjusts faster than consumption (see H
1 in
Figure 3).  In transition, consumption to habit ratio and habit price to capital price ratio both may increase
or decrease, although habit price to capital price ratio is higher than the original ratio at BGP H.  The changes
in the capital to habit ratio can be seen from examining (7c) to obtain
where a31<0 and a33>0 are in (8c), a3￿=0, and    Then, the effect upon capital to habit ratio is a3B￿ x µ> 0.
 which, under the fact -a31/a33>0, has the same sign as dx/d￿, and is thus ambiguous.  We illustrate the case
where consumption to habit ratio increases (path  H
1H
￿ in Figure 3), and therefore capital to habit ratio
increases (path HzH
￿
z in Figure 3).  Finally, if we use (9), the change in economic growth is
Then, the effect upon economic growth of higher dependence of consumption upon habits is
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Alternately, suppose that the equilibrium is originally at a low-growth BGP (i.e., BGP L), then habit
price to capital price ratio increases instantaneously in response to a higher complementarity between
consumption and habits (see L
1 in Figure 3).  In transition, consumption to habit ratio and habit price to
capital price ratio both increase along path L
1L
￿.  As consumption to habit ratio increases, capital to habit
ratio must increase along path  LzL
￿
z  (cf. 11a).  Moreover, as the growth effect has the same sign as the effect
upon consumption to habit ratio (cf. 12a), economic growth is higher both in transition and in steady state.
4-2. When More Habits Can Be Formed by Consumption: Local Dynamics
Suppose first that  the economy is originally at a high-growth equilibrium (i.e., BGP H in Figure 4).
Then, when more habits are formed by a given consumption level, habit price to capital price ratio may
increase or decrease instantaneously if habit price adjusts faster than consumption.  We illustrate the case
with a higher price ratio (see H
1 in Figure 4).  In transition, consumption to habit ratio and habit price to
capital price ratio both decrease toward BGP H
B.  For the effect upon habit to capital ratio, using (11) we
obtain
which under a3B/a33>0, has a direct positive effect, different from that of more important habit effects. 
However, as a31/a33 <0 and dx/dB<0, there is an indirect negative effect through a lower consumption to habit
ratio.  As a result, upon the shock when consumption to habit ratio changes little initially, the direct effect
dominates and capital to habit ratio increases.  Over time, when consumption to habit ratio responds fully
and if it decreases, the net effect is ambiguous.   Finally, using (12) the effects upon the economic growth
rate are
Again, when consumption to habit ratio changes little initially upon the shock, economic growth increases17
through the direct positive effect upon raising capital to habit ratio.  Over time, as consumption to habit ratio
changes more, the net growth effect becomes ambiguous.  
Suppose now that  the equilibrium is originally at a low-growth BGP (i.e., BGP L in Figure 4).
When consumption can accumulate more habits, habit price to capital price ratio increases instantaneously
(see L
1 in Figure 4).  Over time, however, habit price to capital price ratio and consumption to habit ratio may
both decrease or increase.  In Figure 4 we illustrate the case where both ratios increase along path L
1L
B.
Although there is a direct positive effect, the effect upon habit to capital ratio is ambiguous,  due to an
ambiguous indirect effect through consumption to habit ratio (cf. 11b).   Similarly, in spite of a positive
growth effect via the direct positive effect upon habit to capital ratio, the net growth effect is ambiguous, due
to the ambiguous effect through consumption to habit ratio (cf. 12b).
4-3. Global Dynamics
Finally, the dynamics analyzed above is local, but we cannot rule out global dynamics.  When habit
effects become more important near the original high-growth BGP with initial capital to habit ratio at zH(0),
consumption to habit ratio may react earlier than habit price to capital price ratio.  If this is the case,
consumption to habit ratio drops instantaneously from point H to H
2 in response to a habit disturbance (see
Figure 5 ).  Such a drop is then followed by increases or decreases in both habit price to capital price ratio
and consumption to habit ratio.  We illustrate the case where both ratios increase along path H
2L
￿.  However,





[Insert Figure 5 here]
Similarly, when consumption accumulates more habits near the original high-growth BGP with initial
capital to habit ratio at zH(0), consumption to habit ratio may react first and drop instantaneously from point
H to H
2 in response to such a disturbance (in Figure 6).  Then, reductions in or increases in both  habit price
to capital price and consumption to habit ratios may come later, with the case of both ratios decreasing along
path H
2L





[Insert Figure 6 here] 
The global dynamics not only changes a BGP from high growth (H) to low growth (L
￿, L
B), but also18
from low growth (L) to high growth (H
￿, H
B).  As an illustration, with the two aforementioned disturbances
in the neighborhood of BGP L, when consumption adjusts faster than shadow habit price, the equilibrium
jumps from L to L
2 instantaneously, with a higher consumption to habit ratio and a higher habit price to
capital price ratio (see Figures 5 and 6).  This may be followed by increases or decreases in consumption to












Proposition 4.  
(i) Restricted to local dynamics, while faster habit formation has a positive growth effect in the short
run and an ambiguous growth effect in the long run, a stronger habit effect raises economic growth
when the economy is originally at a low-growth equilibrium.  
(ii) Globally, when consumption to habit ratio adjusts faster than habit price to capital price ratio, both
a stronger habit effect and faster habit formation could  shift  the economy to any one of the low-
and high-growth equilibria no matter where the original steady state is located.      
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed a simple competitive, one-sector, endogenous growth model, that
has been extended to allow for a utility function exhibiting habit persistence in preferences .  The key feature
in our model is that  consumption has a long-lasting effect by forming habits.  We use a standard solution
procedure for a three-variable dynamic system without involving the second-order time derivatives for
consumption in the system.  The habit persistence in preferences brings forth a non-linear economic system
resulting in two interior BGPs, with one exhibiting low consumption and habit formation and high economic
growth, and the other displaying high consumption and habit formation and low economic growth and thus,
a development trap.  
The two steady states are saddle points, but for given initial capital and habit stocks the economy
could converge to any of the two steady states depending upon the choices of consumption level.  In the
neighborhood of a steady state, a small disturbance leads the economy to shift to a new steady state around19
the original steady state, if the shadow habit price responds quickly.  However, if consumption responds
faster than the shadow habit price in the face of a small disturbance, the equilibrium may converge to any
one of the two new steady states, no matter whether  the original steady state is a low-growth one or a high-
growth one.   Moreover, the steady states cannot be pareto-ranked in our model because of no market
failures. 
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Max
{c} H(c, k, S, ￿k ￿S) ￿ 1
1￿￿
[( c
S ￿)1￿￿￿1]￿￿k[Ak￿c￿￿kk]￿￿s[Bc µS 1￿µ￿￿sS],
Hc￿ c ￿￿
S ￿(1￿￿) ￿ ￿k￿ ￿s[Bµ S 1￿µ
c 1￿µ ￿ ￿s] ￿ 0, (A1a)
Hcc￿￿ ￿c ￿(￿￿1)
S ￿(1￿￿) ￿ ￿sBµ(1￿µ)S 1￿µ
c ￿µ <0. (A1b)
￿k￿ ￿sBµ S 1￿µ
c 1￿µ ￿ c ￿￿

















S 2 < 0, for µ￿ 1, (A2b)
Appendix  (Not Intended for Publication)
1 Proof of The Hamiltonian Satisfying the Arrow Sufficient Theorem
Maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to c, i.e., 
leads to the following necessary and sufficient  condition
It is obvious (A1a) implies  
and leads to Relationship c=c(S), that satisfies 
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ˆ H(k, S, ￿k ￿S) ￿ 1
1￿￿
[(c(S)
S ￿ )1￿￿￿1]￿￿k[Ak￿c(S)￿￿kk]￿￿s[Bc(S)µS 1￿µ￿￿sS].
ˆ Hk ￿ ￿k(A￿￿k), (A3a)
ˆ HkS ￿ 0, (A3c)
ˆ Hkk ￿ 0, (A3b)
For the terms in the three large brackets in (A2c), we have 





















As in (A2a), by continuity there exists a µ0>0 large enough that the first term in (A2c), which is negative,
dominates the positive second term and the ambiguous third term, and therefore   in (A2c) is negative. c￿(S)
Substituting Relationship c= c(S) into the Hamiltonain, we obtain a new Hamiltonian as follows,
Then, we can derive the following conditions24
ˆ HS ￿ c ￿￿(S)c￿(S)
S ￿(1￿￿) ￿ ￿ c 1￿￿(S)
S ￿(1￿￿)￿1￿ ￿kc￿(S)￿ ￿sB[µc µ￿1(S)c￿(S)S 1￿µ￿ (1￿µ)c µ(S)S ￿µ]￿ ￿s￿S. (A3d)
ˆ HSS ￿￿ ￿c ￿(￿￿1)(S)
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The condition for   is more complicated, and we analyze it for (1) Case µ=1, and (2) Case µ<1. ˆ HSS
1.1 For Case µ=1 
If we substitute into (A2a)-(A2b) under µ=1, (A4a) becomes
which using (A1c) can be rewritten as 






￿ 1￿ 1￿ ￿B
￿￿s
￿1
then  in  (A4c), if the following condition is satisfied ˆ HSS < 0













ˆ HSS ˆ HSk
ˆ HkS ˆ Hkk
￿ 0. (A5)
ˆ HSS ￿￿ ￿c ￿(￿￿1)(S)




￿ ￿ c ￿￿(S)
S ￿(1￿￿)￿1{(1￿￿)c￿(S)￿[￿(1￿￿)￿1]c
S
}￿ (￿k￿ ￿SBµc µ￿1S 1￿µ)c￿(S)























 Therefore, when µ=1, the Hamiltonian is concave and satisfies Arrow’s sufficient theorem.
1.2 For Case  0< µ <1
whose first three terms are the same as in (A4a), the fourth term is also similar to (A4a) if µ is close to 1, and
the last term is an extra term which is ambiguous and is small if µ is close to 1.   
Given the similarity between form (A6) and form (A4a), by continuity there exists µ1 large enough
such that for all µ <µ1, a condition similar to Condition S can guarantee (A6) to be negative, and thus the
Hamiltonian to be concave in (S, k).   
2 Derivation of the Comparative-Static Results When Only Local Dynamics Are Considered.  
If we differentiate (7a)-(7c) around a steady state, we obtain 
where a11, a12, a21, a12, a31 and a33 are as defined in the text, and 
a1￿ ￿￿x
￿
{[(￿￿1)(Bx µ￿￿s)￿µBx µ]￿(￿￿1)(Bx µ￿￿s)Bµ ￿
x µ￿(Bµ)2 ￿





x 1￿µ￿[￿(1￿µ)￿￿(1￿￿)]x µ} > 0,26
a2￿ ￿ x￿ Bµ￿x µ > 0,
a2B ￿ [1￿(1￿￿)µ]￿x µ > 0,
a3B ￿ x µ > 0.
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a3B
a33






































where  ￿ ￿ a33(a11a22 ￿ a21a22) < 0.























































































































where  ￿ ￿ a33(a11a22 ￿ a21a22) < 0.28
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